Document the trust withdrawal cascade:
Keylime breach → posture degraded → sessions downgraded
→ SPIRE re-attestation fails → SVIDs expire
→ service mTLS fails → quorum degrades
No new code for the cascade — it's emergent from existing
re-attestation behavior + the Keylime attestor plugin.
SPIRE federation handles cross-edge propagation through
standard certificate expiration.
Three timing profiles: Standard (~1hr), Enhanced (~15min),
Critical (~5min) with SVID TTL configuration guidance.
Example SPIRE server config with Keylime attestor + k8s_psat
fallback for nodes without hardware TPM.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
Signed-off-by: Tyler J King <tking727@gmail.com>
New shellstream extension §10.6 network-policy@guildhouse.dev carrying
GovernedNetworkPolicy hash in SSH certificates. New §8.7 in upper layers
spec documenting network governance lifecycle events (attach, detach,
flow policy, route announce/withdraw) emitted by governance-notifier
using the tiered consent transport model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add consent-channels@guildhouse.dev SSH certificate extension for
advertising available consent transport channels. Add §8.6 to upper
layers spec describing HFL as the in-process capability boundary
within Shellstream sessions, with WIT as the formal contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>