//! Corpus directory gate — the live killswitch.
//!
//! Verifies two properties before a binary is allowed to execute:
//!
//! 1. The binary name is present in the corpus directory keyed by CID
//!    (existing directory-name check).
//! 2. The binary's on-disk SHA-256 matches the CID its directory is
//!    named for (content-verification added as part of the CID-content
//!    verification audit fix).
//!
//! Property 2 closes the gap where an attacker with write access to the
//! corpus directory could plant a malicious binary under a legitimate
//! CID and have it execute with that CID's privileges. With content
//! verification, the corpus directory can still be tampered with, but
//! the tampered binary will not run.
//!
//! Mismatches emit Chronicle-shaped structured tracing events
//! (`target: "chronicle"`) with the event_type constants from
//! [`crate::chronicle_events`], so tamper incidents remain forensically
//! complete rather than denied-and-forgotten.

use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use tracing::warn;

use crate::chronicle_events as events;

/// Result of a corpus check.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum CorpusCheckResult {
    /// Binary found in corpus and its content hashes to the expected CID.
    Allowed,
    /// Corpus is ungoverned — no check performed.
    Ungoverned,
    /// Corpus directory not found on this host (not an error, host may not have it mounted).
    NotMounted,
    /// Binary not in corpus directory — denied (killswitch active).
    Denied { command: String, corpus_cid: String },
    /// Binary present but content does not hash to the expected CID.
    /// Denied — the file has been tampered with or was placed under a
    /// CID directory that does not match its content.
    ContentMismatch {
        command: String,
        corpus_cid: String,
        actual_cid: String,
        path: PathBuf,
    },
    /// Binary present but could not be read for hashing. Fail-closed:
    /// a read we cannot verify is a verification we cannot complete.
    ReadFailed {
        command: String,
        corpus_cid: String,
        path: PathBuf,
        detail: String,
    },
}

/// Default corpus base directory.
pub const DEFAULT_CORPUS_BASE: &str = "/opt/substrate/corpus";

/// Check if a command is authorized in the corpus directory.
///
/// `base_dir` overrides the default /opt/substrate/corpus (set via GSH_CORPUS_DIR env).
/// Returns Ok(result) always. Caller decides whether to block on Denied,
/// ContentMismatch, or ReadFailed — all three are execution-denied
/// states.
pub fn corpus_check(corpus_cid: &str, command: &str) -> CorpusCheckResult {
    corpus_check_with_base(corpus_cid, command, DEFAULT_CORPUS_BASE)
}

/// corpus_check with an explicit base directory.
pub fn corpus_check_with_base(corpus_cid: &str, command: &str, base_dir: &str) -> CorpusCheckResult {
    if corpus_cid == "sha256:ungoverned" {
        return CorpusCheckResult::Ungoverned;
    }

    let corpus_dir = Path::new(base_dir).join(corpus_cid);
    if !corpus_dir.exists() {
        return CorpusCheckResult::NotMounted;
    }

    // Extract command name (first word, basename only):
    let cmd_name = command.split_whitespace().next().unwrap_or(command);
    let cmd_name = Path::new(cmd_name)
        .file_name()
        .map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
        .unwrap_or_else(|| cmd_name.to_string());

    let binary_path = corpus_dir.join(&cmd_name);
    if !binary_path.exists() {
        return CorpusCheckResult::Denied {
            command: cmd_name,
            corpus_cid: corpus_cid.to_string(),
        };
    }

    // Content verification: hash the binary on disk and compare to the
    // CID the directory is named for. OCI registries make the admission
    // layer's CID→content binding cryptographic; this re-check protects
    // against post-admission filesystem tampering.
    match std::fs::read(&binary_path) {
        Ok(bytes) => {
            let actual_cid = format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(Sha256::digest(&bytes)));
            if actual_cid == corpus_cid {
                CorpusCheckResult::Allowed
            } else {
                warn!(
                    target: "chronicle",
                    event_type = events::CID_MISMATCH_EXECUTION_CONTENT_MISMATCH,
                    claimed_cid = corpus_cid,
                    actual_cid = %actual_cid,
                    context = %binary_path.display(),
                    actor = "gsh",
                    severity = "error",
                    command = %cmd_name,
                    "Corpus binary content does not match CID directory name (tamper signal)"
                );
                CorpusCheckResult::ContentMismatch {
                    command: cmd_name,
                    corpus_cid: corpus_cid.to_string(),
                    actual_cid,
                    path: binary_path,
                }
            }
        }
        Err(e) => {
            let detail = e.to_string();
            warn!(
                target: "chronicle",
                event_type = events::CID_MISMATCH_EXECUTION_READ_FAILED,
                claimed_cid = corpus_cid,
                context = %binary_path.display(),
                actor = "gsh",
                severity = "error",
                command = %cmd_name,
                detail = %detail,
                "Could not read corpus binary for hash verification (fail-closed)"
            );
            CorpusCheckResult::ReadFailed {
                command: cmd_name,
                corpus_cid: corpus_cid.to_string(),
                path: binary_path,
                detail,
            }
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    //! Scenario coverage map (execution half of the CID-content
    //! verification audit fix):
    //!
    //! - **Valid CID, content matches: execution allowed** —
    //!   `binary_with_matching_content_is_allowed`.
    //! - **Valid CID at admission, tampered content at execution:
    //!   execution denies** — `tampered_content_triggers_content_mismatch`.
    //! - **Missing binary where directory exists: denied (existing
    //!   behavior preserved as sanity check)** —
    //!   `missing_binary_in_corpus_is_denied`.
    //! - **Binary present but unreadable: denied fail-closed** —
    //!   `unreadable_binary_triggers_read_failed`.
    //! - **Sentinel: ungoverned CID** — `ungoverned_skips_check`.
    //! - **Sentinel: corpus directory not mounted on host** —
    //!   `missing_corpus_dir_reports_not_mounted`.
    //!
    //! The admission half (forged CID rejected at CRD reconcile) is
    //! covered in corpus-operator::verifier.

    use super::*;

    /// Write bytes to `dir/cid/name` and return the path so the caller can
    /// pass a matching CID for the happy path or a different one to
    /// simulate tamper.
    fn write_binary(dir: &Path, cid: &str, name: &str, contents: &[u8]) -> PathBuf {
        let corpus_dir = dir.join(cid);
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&corpus_dir).unwrap();
        let path = corpus_dir.join(name);
        std::fs::write(&path, contents).unwrap();
        path
    }

    fn cid_of(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
        format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes)))
    }

    #[test]
    fn ungoverned_skips_check() {
        assert!(matches!(
            corpus_check("sha256:ungoverned", "anything"),
            CorpusCheckResult::Ungoverned
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn missing_corpus_dir_reports_not_mounted() {
        assert!(matches!(
            corpus_check("sha256:nonexistent", "kubectl"),
            CorpusCheckResult::NotMounted
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn binary_with_matching_content_is_allowed() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let contents = b"#!/bin/sh\necho kubectl\n";
        let cid = cid_of(contents);
        write_binary(dir.path(), &cid, "kubectl", contents);

        let base = dir.path().to_str().unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            corpus_check_with_base(&cid, "kubectl get pods -n test", base),
            CorpusCheckResult::Allowed
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn missing_binary_in_corpus_is_denied() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let contents = b"kubectl";
        let cid = cid_of(contents);
        write_binary(dir.path(), &cid, "kubectl", contents);

        let base = dir.path().to_str().unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            corpus_check_with_base(&cid, "helm install", base),
            CorpusCheckResult::Denied { .. }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_content_triggers_content_mismatch() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let claimed = cid_of(b"original-kubectl-content");
        // Write content that hashes to something OTHER than the claimed CID
        // but store it under the claimed CID's directory — the tamper case.
        write_binary(dir.path(), &claimed, "kubectl", b"malicious-replacement");

        let base = dir.path().to_str().unwrap();
        match corpus_check_with_base(&claimed, "kubectl", base) {
            CorpusCheckResult::ContentMismatch {
                corpus_cid,
                actual_cid,
                ..
            } => {
                assert_eq!(corpus_cid, claimed);
                assert_ne!(actual_cid, claimed);
            }
            other => panic!("expected ContentMismatch, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    /// Place a directory at the path where the binary should live; the
    /// `exists()` check passes but `read()` fails. Verifies the fail-closed
    /// path: an unreadable binary is denied rather than allowed.
    #[test]
    fn unreadable_binary_triggers_read_failed() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let claimed = cid_of(b"any-content");
        let corpus_dir = dir.path().join(&claimed);
        // Make a directory at the binary path — it satisfies `exists()` but
        // `read()` will fail with EISDIR or similar.
        std::fs::create_dir_all(corpus_dir.join("kubectl")).unwrap();

        let base = dir.path().to_str().unwrap();
        match corpus_check_with_base(&claimed, "kubectl", base) {
            CorpusCheckResult::ReadFailed {
                corpus_cid,
                command,
                ..
            } => {
                assert_eq!(corpus_cid, claimed);
                assert_eq!(command, "kubectl");
            }
            other => panic!("expected ReadFailed, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }
}