e744336385
C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
33 lines
1 KiB
Python
33 lines
1 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import http
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from collections.abc import Mapping
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class HTTPException(Exception):
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def __init__(self, status_code: int, detail: str | None = None, headers: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
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if detail is None:
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detail = http.HTTPStatus(status_code).phrase
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self.status_code = status_code
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self.detail = detail
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self.headers = headers
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def __str__(self) -> str:
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return f"{self.status_code}: {self.detail}"
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def __repr__(self) -> str:
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class_name = self.__class__.__name__
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return f"{class_name}(status_code={self.status_code!r}, detail={self.detail!r})"
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class WebSocketException(Exception):
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def __init__(self, code: int, reason: str | None = None) -> None:
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self.code = code
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self.reason = reason or ""
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def __str__(self) -> str:
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return f"{self.code}: {self.reason}"
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def __repr__(self) -> str:
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class_name = self.__class__.__name__
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return f"{class_name}(code={self.code!r}, reason={self.reason!r})"
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