e744336385
C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
27 lines
534 B
Python
27 lines
534 B
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import sys
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from ruff import find_ruff_bin
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def _run() -> None:
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ruff = find_ruff_bin()
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if sys.platform == "win32":
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import subprocess
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# Avoid emitting a traceback on interrupt
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try:
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completed_process = subprocess.run([ruff, *sys.argv[1:]])
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except KeyboardInterrupt:
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sys.exit(2)
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sys.exit(completed_process.returncode)
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else:
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os.execvp(ruff, [ruff, *sys.argv[1:]])
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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_run()
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