C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
8 lines
201 B
Text
8 lines
201 B
Text
[console_scripts]
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pyrsa-decrypt=rsa.cli:decrypt
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pyrsa-encrypt=rsa.cli:encrypt
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pyrsa-keygen=rsa.cli:keygen
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pyrsa-priv2pub=rsa.util:private_to_public
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pyrsa-sign=rsa.cli:sign
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pyrsa-verify=rsa.cli:verify
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