C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
23 lines
904 B
Python
23 lines
904 B
Python
import sys
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from .compat import chardet
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# This code exists for backwards compatibility reasons.
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# I don't like it either. Just look the other way. :)
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for package in ("urllib3", "idna"):
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locals()[package] = __import__(package)
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# This traversal is apparently necessary such that the identities are
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# preserved (requests.packages.urllib3.* is urllib3.*)
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for mod in list(sys.modules):
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if mod == package or mod.startswith(f"{package}."):
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sys.modules[f"requests.packages.{mod}"] = sys.modules[mod]
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if chardet is not None:
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target = chardet.__name__
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for mod in list(sys.modules):
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if mod == target or mod.startswith(f"{target}."):
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imported_mod = sys.modules[mod]
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sys.modules[f"requests.packages.{mod}"] = imported_mod
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mod = mod.replace(target, "chardet")
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sys.modules[f"requests.packages.{mod}"] = imported_mod
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