C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
34 lines
734 B
Python
34 lines
734 B
Python
"""
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requests.hooks
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This module provides the capabilities for the Requests hooks system.
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Available hooks:
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``response``:
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The response generated from a Request.
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"""
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HOOKS = ["response"]
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def default_hooks():
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return {event: [] for event in HOOKS}
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# TODO: response is the only one
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def dispatch_hook(key, hooks, hook_data, **kwargs):
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"""Dispatches a hook dictionary on a given piece of data."""
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hooks = hooks or {}
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hooks = hooks.get(key)
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if hooks:
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if hasattr(hooks, "__call__"):
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hooks = [hooks]
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for hook in hooks:
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_hook_data = hook(hook_data, **kwargs)
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if _hook_data is not None:
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hook_data = _hook_data
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return hook_data
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