C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
18 lines
430 B
Python
18 lines
430 B
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python
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"""
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requests.certs
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This module returns the preferred default CA certificate bundle. There is
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only one — the one from the certifi package.
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If you are packaging Requests, e.g., for a Linux distribution or a managed
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environment, you can change the definition of where() to return a separately
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packaged CA bundle.
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"""
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from certifi import where
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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print(where())
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