e744336385
C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
35 lines
797 B
Python
35 lines
797 B
Python
# This file is dual licensed under the terms of the Apache License, Version
|
|
# 2.0, and the BSD License. See the LICENSE file in the root of this repository
|
|
# for complete details.
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
from cryptography import utils
|
|
from cryptography.hazmat.bindings._rust import x509 as rust_x509
|
|
|
|
|
|
class LogEntryType(utils.Enum):
|
|
X509_CERTIFICATE = 0
|
|
PRE_CERTIFICATE = 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Version(utils.Enum):
|
|
v1 = 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
class SignatureAlgorithm(utils.Enum):
|
|
"""
|
|
Signature algorithms that are valid for SCTs.
|
|
|
|
These are exactly the same as SignatureAlgorithm in RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2).
|
|
|
|
See: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1>
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
ANONYMOUS = 0
|
|
RSA = 1
|
|
DSA = 2
|
|
ECDSA = 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
SignedCertificateTimestamp = rust_x509.Sct
|