e744336385
C-6: ConnectorRuntime enforces capability_mask per operation.
READ-only ACs cannot invoke MUTATE operations (wipe, lock, retire).
C-7: AC validated against database (exists, active, not expired)
before connector invocation.
C-9: Delegated AC capability bounded by delegator's capability.
C-10: Command counter uses atomic SQL increment with limit check.
M-23: expire_stale() uses same atomic SQL pattern.
H-1: Sensitive credential fields hidden from repr/logs via repr=False.
H-2: Stub backend requires ALLOW_STUB_CREDENTIALS=true to activate.
H-3: Kerberos backend raises CredentialResolutionError instead of
returning stub ticket.
H-4: Chronicle INTENT emitted before execution, RESULT after.
H-5: device_id validated as UUID before Graph API URL interpolation.
H-8: ConnectorRuntime enforces governance for all connector invocations.
Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
30 lines
747 B
Python
30 lines
747 B
Python
import sys
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if sys.version_info < (3,):
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try:
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from thread import allocate_lock
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except ImportError:
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from dummy_thread import allocate_lock
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else:
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try:
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from _thread import allocate_lock
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except ImportError:
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from _dummy_thread import allocate_lock
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##import sys
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##l1 = allocate_lock
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##class allocate_lock(object):
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## def __init__(self):
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## self._real = l1()
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## def __enter__(self):
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## for i in range(4, 0, -1):
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## print sys._getframe(i).f_code
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## print
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## return self._real.__enter__()
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## def __exit__(self, *args):
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## return self._real.__exit__(*args)
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## def acquire(self, f):
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## assert f is False
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## return self._real.acquire(f)
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