docs: add Bastion product roadmap
Feature matrix, release plan v0.4 through v1.0, reference deployment, architecture principles, and contribution guide. Signed-off-by: Tyler King <tking@guildhouse.dev>
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# Bastion — Product Roadmap
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**Unified Device & Workspace Governance for the Enterprise**
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*Last updated: April 2026*
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---
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## Vision
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One governance authority, every endpoint type, every management mode, unified by identity. Bastion is the open-source MDM control plane that governs physical endpoints and virtual workspaces under a single identity-aware, cryptographically attestable policy framework.
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---
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## Feature Matrix
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### Legend
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| Status | Meaning |
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|--------|---------|
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| ✅ Shipped | Implemented, tested, in bastion-v0.3 |
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| 🔨 In Progress | Partially implemented or stubbed |
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| 📐 Designed | Architecture defined, not yet coded |
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| 🗺️ Planned | Scoped and prioritized, design pending |
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| 💡 Future | Identified need, not yet scoped |
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---
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### Identity & Authentication
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Entra ID identity driver (JWKS-verified) | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Native JWT validation, device_id extraction, MFA detection |
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| Keycloak identity driver (JWKS-verified) | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Shared JWKSVerifier, realm_access roles, DID construction |
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| Shared JWKS verification framework | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Reusable across all identity drivers, kid-miss refresh |
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| on_behalf_of impersonation gating | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Requires `gsap:impersonate` role |
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| Okta identity driver | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | OIDC JWT verification, Okta-specific claims |
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| SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Service-to-service identity within governance infra |
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| FIDO2/WebAuthn integration | 💡 Future | — | Hardware key attestation for operator authentication |
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| Shared bearer auth middleware | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | FastAPI `Depends(verify_bearer)` for all protected endpoints |
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### Device Management — Traditional Mode
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Intune connector (7 operations) | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | list, get, compliance, sync, lock, retire, wipe |
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| Intune compliance cache | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | In-memory with configurable TTL |
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| Compliance-gated AC issuance | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Per-accord and global configuration |
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| Entra device_id in AC metadata | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Extracted from JWT deviceid claim |
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| device_id UUID validation | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Path traversal prevention for Graph API |
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| Intune MCP tools | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | 4 tools via governed connector invocation |
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| Capability-enforced operations | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | READ/PROPOSE/MUTATE per-operation |
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| Keylime connector (TPM attestation) | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Measured boot + IMA runtime integrity |
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| Fleet/osquery connector | 🗺️ Planned | v0.5 | Cross-platform posture collection for Linux/macOS/Windows |
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| Jamf connector (macOS) | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | macOS endpoint compliance and management |
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| SNMP/API network device connector | 💡 Future | — | Switch/router/firewall posture assessment |
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| Windows Device Health Attestation | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | TPM attestation via Intune DHA Graph API |
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### Device Management — VDI Mode
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| VDI mode architecture | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Workspace provisioning, profile governance, session binding |
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| Apache Guacamole adapter | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | REST API integration for session lifecycle |
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| Governed shell integration (Bascule) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | Stubbed connector, needs Shellstream transport |
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| FSLogix / profile governance | 📐 Designed | v0.7 | Content-addressed profiles as governed artifacts |
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| Citrix CVAD adapter | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Broker Service API for session lifecycle |
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| VMware Horizon adapter | 🗺️ Planned | v0.8 | REST API integration |
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| Session-device binding | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Correlate Bascule session with originating device posture |
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| Mid-session compliance re-evaluation | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Revoke/restrict session when device posture degrades |
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### Hardware Security
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| TPM attestation (Linux via Keylime) | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Measured boot, PCR verification, IMA integration |
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| TPM attestation (Windows via DHA) | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Intune Device Health Attestation Graph API |
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| HBOM collection (Linux) | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | dmidecode, sysfs, lspci, lsusb, TPM PCR values |
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| HBOM collection (Windows) | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | WMI hardware classes, TPM WMI |
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| HBOM drift detection | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Content-hash comparison, unexpected component alerting |
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| Firmware version verification | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | HBOM declared version vs TPM-measured version |
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| HardwareIntegrity posture condition | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Composite: TPM + HBOM + firmware all valid |
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| Barcode/QR enrollment scanning | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | USB/camera barcode scan for device onboarding, serial/model/SKU auto-population |
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| Scan-to-HBOM verification | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Compare scanned vendor declaration against TPM/OS-reported hardware at first boot |
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| Supply chain provenance tracking | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Full hardware lifecycle: procurement scan → provisioning → production → decommission |
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### Connector Framework
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| ConnectorPlugin ABC | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | API-mediated connector pattern |
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| ConnectorRuntime with Chronicle audit | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Intent-before-execution, result-after |
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| SessionTransport / SessionConnector | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | Session-based connector pattern with lifecycle |
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| OrchestratorConnector | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | Multi-step workflow pattern with partial-completion |
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| Bascule connector (stubbed) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | AC-as-credential, needs Shellstream transport |
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| PowerShell connector (stubbed) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.5 | Kerberos credential, needs pypsrp transport |
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| Ansible connector (stubbed) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.5 | Orchestrator pattern, needs ansible-runner |
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| Keylime connector | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | TPM attestation API integration |
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| Connector plugin SDK | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Guild-facing SDK for third-party connectors |
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### Credential Management
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| CredentialResolver abstraction | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | Type routing, expiry enforcement, zero-storage |
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| Entra credential backend (OAuth) | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | MSAL on-behalf-of token acquisition |
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| Bascule credential passthrough | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | AC is the credential |
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| Stub credential backend | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | Dev/testing only, requires explicit opt-in (v0.3) |
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| Credential repr safety | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | field(repr=False) on all sensitive fields |
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| Kerberos credential resolution | 🔨 In Progress | v0.5 | Entra Kerberos proxy or hybrid AD |
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| SSH certificate credential | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Short-lived certs from Bascule CA |
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| HashiCorp Vault backend | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Dynamic secrets for all credential types |
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| CyberArk backend | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Enterprise PAM integration |
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| Azure Key Vault backend | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Cloud-native secrets for Azure environments |
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### Authorization & Governance
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| AC issuance (GSAP spec) | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Full lifecycle: issue, poll, consume |
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| Completion receipts | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Outcome recording with behavioral attestation |
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| Capability mask enforcement | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | READ/PROPOSE/MUTATE per-operation check |
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| AC validation in ConnectorRuntime | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Exists, active, not expired |
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| Session mode ACs | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Multi-operation sessions with session_end |
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| Delegation lifecycle | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Create, revoke, query, list, TTL, command limits |
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| Bounded delegation capability | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Cannot exceed delegator's capability mask |
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| Atomic command counter | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | SQL-level increment with limit check |
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| DeviceRouter | ✅ Shipped | v0.2 | Automatic connector selection by device OS/channel |
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| Declarative compliance policies | 🗺️ Planned | v0.5 | Cross-platform policy definitions |
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| Accord template externalization | 🗺️ Planned | v0.5 | From hardcoded dict to CRD/file-based |
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| Ceremony-gated operations | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Multi-party approval for destructive operations |
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| Delegation depth enforcement | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | Chain traversal and depth limit |
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### AI Agent Integration
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| MCP tool surface | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | JSON-RPC 2.0, 11 core + 4 Intune tools |
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| Agent delegation system | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Ephemeral IdP registrations, scoped ACs |
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| Delegation with Entra registrar | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | App registration + service principal + client credential |
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| Delegation with Keycloak registrar | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Ephemeral service-account clients |
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| MCP authentication | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | Bearer token required for all MCP operations |
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| MCP AC validation | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Governed tools require real AC (no synthetic bypass) |
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| Harness specification | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Delegation scope, escalation boundary, observation/action mode |
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| Harness enforcement in gsh | 📐 Designed | v0.7 | gsh reads harness.toml, enforces scope |
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| Agent telemetry classification | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Distinguish agent ops from human ops in Chronicle |
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| Automated remediation harness | 📐 Designed | v0.7 | Compliance violation → agent remediation within scope |
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### Compliance & Attestation
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Compliance-gated authorization | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Non-compliant devices denied ACs |
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| PostureLevel (Lockdown..Normal) | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | Wire-compatible with Shellstream |
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| WitnessLevel (L1-L4) | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | Telemetry granularity per SAT-SPEC-ZONE-001 |
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| PostureCondition framework | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | 9 condition kinds including Custom |
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| WitnessConfig on AccordSpec | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | Conditions + delegates + interval + breach response |
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| PostureTransitionArtifact | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | Merkle-anchored posture change evidence |
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| Posture condition evaluator | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint2 | 6 checkers implemented, 2 stubbed |
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| Witness event classification | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint2 | Operational/Witness/Forensic at ingestion bridge |
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| TpmAttestationValid condition | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | Keylime-backed posture condition |
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| HbomNoDrift condition | 📐 Designed | v0.5 | HBOM integrity-backed posture condition |
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| HostPostureSnapshot generation | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Selective merkle proofs for external observers |
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| Witness delegation forwarding | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Pulsar subscription → filtered CloudEvents to delegates |
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| Insurance observability API | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Read-only posture history for insurers |
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| Dynamic premium integration | 💡 Future | — | Insurer-side premium calculation from posture stream |
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| CMMC compliance mapping | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Map Bastion posture conditions to CMMC practices |
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| SOC 2 evidence generation | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Automated evidence collection for SOC 2 controls |
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| SLSA build provenance integration | 📐 Designed | v0.8 | Build attestation feeding into device posture |
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### Audit & Telemetry
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Chronicle event emission | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | CloudEvents to ingestion bridge |
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| Intent-before-execution audit | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | INTENT event before, RESULT event after |
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| GovernanceEnvelope | ✅ Shipped | cid-phase3 | Binds git ref + actor + accord + timestamp |
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| ChronicleGitEvent | ✅ Shipped | cid-phase3 | Git-originated events in Chronicle chain |
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| Witness event types (0x2801-0x2805) | ✅ Shipped | witness-sprint1 | Posture verified/breached, delegate lifecycle |
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| Chronicle migration to CloudEvents | ✅ Shipped | boundary-cleanup | All emitters use CloudEvents 1.0 |
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| DEVICE_COMPLIANCE_CHECKED event | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Compliance gate decisions audited |
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| CONNECTOR_INVOCATION_INTENT event | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Pre-execution audit record |
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| Broker Chronicle → CloudEvents gRPC | 🗺️ Planned | v0.5 | Replace Forgejo webhook format (M6.2 TODO) |
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| Forensic telemetry classification | 📐 Designed | v0.6 | Full Chronicle stream for incident investigation |
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### Multi-Tenancy & Fleet Management
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Device inventory (Intune-sourced) | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Windows managed devices via Graph API |
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| Device inventory (Linux) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.5 | Via Bascule connector collect operation |
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| Cross-tenant MSP dashboard | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Dioxus frontend with per-client views |
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| Tenant isolation in broker | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Per-tenant Accord scope, data isolation |
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| Vertical policy templates | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Healthcare, legal, manufacturing, tribal presets |
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| Fleet-wide posture aggregation | 🗺️ Planned | v0.7 | Cross-device posture summary per tenant |
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| Billing/usage metering | 💡 Future | — | Per-tenant usage for MSP billing |
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### Platform & Infrastructure
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| Feature | Status | Version | Notes |
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|---------|--------|---------|-------|
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| FastAPI + SQLite (prototype) | ✅ Shipped | v0.1 | Single-container deployment |
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| PostgreSQL migration | 🗺️ Planned | v0.5 | asyncpg, same SQLModel layer |
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| SQLite file permissions (0o600) | 🔨 In Progress | v0.4 | Security hardening |
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| Pydantic SecretStr for secrets | ✅ Shipped | v0.3 | Settings safety |
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| Helm chart | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | K8s deployment |
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| Rust port — AC issuance | 🗺️ Planned | v1.0 | Axum/Tonic, governance-types crate |
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| Rust port — connectors | 🗺️ Planned | v1.0 | reqwest + azure_identity |
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| Rust port — credential resolver | 🗺️ Planned | v1.0 | Same zero-storage pattern |
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| OpenAPI spec generation | 🗺️ Planned | v0.6 | Auto-generate from FastAPI routes |
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---
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## Release Plan
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### v0.4 — Authentication Hardening (Q2 2026)
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**Theme:** Close the remaining security gaps and establish shared auth middleware.
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- Shared `Depends(verify_bearer)` FastAPI middleware (closes C-4, C-8)
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- MCP endpoint full bearer authentication
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- Delegation endpoint bearer authentication with DID from token
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- Delegation depth enforcement (H-7)
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- SQLite file permissions (H-6)
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- Bascule connector: real Shellstream transport integration (first real session connector)
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**Exit criteria:** All 10 critical findings fully closed. Zero unauthenticated endpoints.
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### v0.5 — Hardware Trust & Real Transports (Q3 2026)
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**Theme:** TPM attestation, HBOM, and the first real management transports.
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- Keylime connector for TPM-based measured boot attestation
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- Windows Device Health Attestation via Intune DHA Graph API
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- HBOM collection (Linux via Bascule, Windows via PowerShell)
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- HBOM drift detection with content-hash comparison
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- HardwareIntegrity composite posture condition
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- PowerShell connector: real pypsrp transport
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- Ansible connector: real ansible-runner integration
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- Fleet/osquery connector for cross-platform posture collection
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- PostgreSQL migration (asyncpg)
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- Declarative compliance policy engine (cross-platform evaluation)
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- Accord template externalization (file/CRD-based)
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- Broker Chronicle client migration to CloudEvents (not Forgejo format)
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- Device inventory for Linux endpoints (via Bascule collect)
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- Session-device binding (correlate Bascule session to originating device)
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**Exit criteria:** TPM attestation operational on Linux. At least two real transports (Bascule + PowerShell) executing against live targets. HBOM collected and verified.
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### v0.6 — VDI Mode & Multi-Tenancy (Q4 2026)
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**Theme:** Virtual workspace governance and MSP fleet management.
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- Apache Guacamole VDI adapter
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- Governed shell (Bascule) as a VDI mode workspace
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- Workspace provisioning lifecycle (auth → provision → monitor → terminate)
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- Mid-session compliance re-evaluation
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- Session-device correlation in unified audit trail
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- HostPostureSnapshot generation (Notarization Boundary)
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- Witness delegation forwarding (Pulsar → filtered CloudEvents)
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- Tenant isolation in broker (per-client Accord scope)
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- Cross-tenant MSP dashboard (Dioxus)
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- Harness specification for AI agents
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- Agent telemetry classification (agent vs human ops)
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- Ceremony-gated destructive operations
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- Barcode/QR device enrollment (USB scanner + camera/mobile support)
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- Scan-to-HBOM verification (vendor declaration vs actual hardware at first boot)
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- Helm chart for K8s deployment
|
||||||
|
- OpenAPI spec auto-generation
|
||||||
|
- Okta identity driver
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Exit criteria:** VDI mode operational with at least one platform adapter. MSP can manage multiple clients with tenant isolation. Witness delegation producing snapshots.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### v0.7 — Insurance & Compliance Frameworks (Q1 2027)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Theme:** Compliance automation and the insurance observability product.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Insurance observability API (read-only posture history)
|
||||||
|
- CMMC compliance mapping (posture conditions → CMMC practices)
|
||||||
|
- SOC 2 evidence generation (automated control evidence)
|
||||||
|
- Vertical policy templates (healthcare, legal, manufacturing, tribal)
|
||||||
|
- Fleet-wide posture aggregation (cross-device summary)
|
||||||
|
- FSLogix / profile governance (content-addressed VDI profiles)
|
||||||
|
- Harness enforcement in gsh (harness.toml → scope enforcement)
|
||||||
|
- Automated remediation harness (compliance violation → agent action)
|
||||||
|
- Citrix CVAD adapter
|
||||||
|
- Jamf connector (macOS)
|
||||||
|
- SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity
|
||||||
|
- HashiCorp Vault credential backend
|
||||||
|
- CyberArk credential backend
|
||||||
|
- Connector plugin SDK for guild/third-party development
|
||||||
|
- Supply chain provenance tracking (procurement scan → provisioning → production → decommission)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Exit criteria:** Insurance observability API operational. At least one compliance framework (CMMC or SOC 2) mapped. Harness-governed AI agents performing automated remediation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### v0.8 — Ecosystem & Scale (Q2 2027)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Theme:** Scale, ecosystem growth, and advanced attestation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- VMware Horizon VDI adapter
|
||||||
|
- SLSA build provenance integration
|
||||||
|
- Supply chain provenance tracking (HBOM lifecycle)
|
||||||
|
- Distributed cache for multi-worker deployments
|
||||||
|
- Advanced posture analytics (trend analysis, predictive degradation)
|
||||||
|
- Guild marketplace integration (connector/policy template distribution)
|
||||||
|
- Forensic telemetry mode (full Chronicle stream for incident investigation)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### v1.0 — Rust Port & Production Hardening (Q3 2027)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Theme:** Production-grade Rust implementation for performance and safety.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Rust port: AC issuance and CR ingestion (Axum/Tonic)
|
||||||
|
- Rust port: connector framework (reqwest + azure_identity)
|
||||||
|
- Rust port: credential resolver (same zero-storage architecture)
|
||||||
|
- Rust port: identity drivers (JWKS verification)
|
||||||
|
- Python broker archived as reference implementation
|
||||||
|
- Full conformance test suite (Python and Rust implementations must pass)
|
||||||
|
- Performance benchmarking and load testing
|
||||||
|
- Security audit of Rust implementation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Reference Deployment
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Tribal Nation NOC (2026-2027)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The primary reference deployment validating all Bastion capabilities:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Sovereignty:** Self-hosted control plane, local governance authority
|
||||||
|
- **Mixed fleet:** Windows workstations (Entra/Intune) + Linux terminals (Bascule/GSH)
|
||||||
|
- **Dual-mode:** Physical NOC terminals + VDI remote access for off-site operators
|
||||||
|
- **Hardware trust:** TPM attestation on all NOC endpoints, HBOM verification
|
||||||
|
- **Compliance:** Continuous posture attestation for tribal cybersecurity requirements
|
||||||
|
- **Insurance:** Witness delegation to cyber insurer for dynamic premium model
|
||||||
|
- **AI agents:** Harness-governed automated monitoring and remediation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Architecture Principles
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. **Zero credential storage.** The broker holds authorization decisions (ACs), never credentials. Short-lived credentials acquired at invocation time, discarded after use.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2. **Governance by identity, not device.** The identity (who) determines the policy (what they can do). The device (where they are) is a posture signal, not the access decision.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3. **Delegate enforcement, own decisions.** Bastion makes governance decisions. Platform-specific tools (Intune, Keylime, Ansible, Bascule) enforce them. The control plane is durable; backends evolve.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4. **Attest, don't assert.** Every governance claim is backed by cryptographic evidence — TPM measurements, merkle-anchored posture records, signed attestation snapshots. Software assertions are corroborated by hardware proofs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5. **Pluggable everything.** Identity drivers, credential backends, connectors, VDI adapters, compliance policies. The framework ships; the ecosystem grows.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6. **Audit before execute.** Chronicle INTENT event before every operation, RESULT event after. The audit trail survives execution failures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Contributing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Bastion follows the guild-based contribution model:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **License:** Apache 2.0
|
||||||
|
- **Contributions:** Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO), not CLA
|
||||||
|
- **Connector development:** Implement the ConnectorPlugin ABC; the framework provides Chronicle audit, GSAP validation, and credential resolution
|
||||||
|
- **Identity drivers:** Implement the IdentityDriver ABC with JWKSVerifier for JWT validation
|
||||||
|
- **Credential backends:** Implement the CredentialBackend ABC with enforced TTL on all credentials
|
||||||
|
- **Policy templates:** Submit compliance policy definitions for specific verticals or frameworks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
See bastion-security-audit.md for the current security posture and known limitations.
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue